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CHILD'S DINING HALL CO. v. SWINGLER
regards enforcing restrictive covenants in equity, was formulated by Judge Digges in Clem v. Valentine," wherein he
succinctly stated:
"As a result of the examination of the many cases
involving this question, and the reasons which the courts
have assigned for reaching their conclusions, we are of
the opinion that the application for relief in such cases
is addressed largely to the conscience of the court and
is governed by equitable principles; that if the language
of the covenant, the respective positions of the parties,
and the surrounding circumstances, taken singly or together, show that the covenant was entered into for the
benefit of the land retained by. the covenantee, creating
on equity or right appurtenant to the land, to be exercised by such person as for the time being is the owner
thereof, it will be enforced, without regard to whether
the covenant does or does not run with the land conveyed, or whether or not it is a general scheme or plan
of development of the property in question.
THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
BETWEEN RESTAURANT-KEEPER
AND GUEST
Child's Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler 1
Plaintiff-appellee ordered a crabcake sandwich in a
restaurant operated by defendant-appellant, and was served
it at a table in that restaurant. As she was eating the last
remaining small piece of the bread she bit down on a piece
of tin which was imbedded in the bread. The piece of tin
lodged between her teeth, was later removed, but caused an
abscess which necessitated removal of a tooth, and caused
severe shock and pain. The suit was originally framed in
tort but was amended to assumpsit, alleging an express
warranty, and at the trial, to meet the proof, a second
amended declaration alleging an implied warranty was
filed. The lower court granted plaintiff's implied warranty prayer, and refused defendant's demurrer prayer.
From a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appeals. Held,
two judges dissenting: Reversed and remanded. No im85le Supra,
note 10, 155 Md. 19, 28.
A collection of excerpts from Maryland cases is
found In Best, Re-

strictions and Restrictive Covenants.
1197 AtI. 105 (Md. 1938).
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plied warranty existed, therefore to enable plaintiff to recover in a case such as this there must be an express warranty, or knowledge of the unmerchantable quality of the
goods, or negligence.
The issue nominally presented by the facts is whether or
not in a restaurant one purchases merely service, or enters
into a contract for the sale of food. While the question is
by no means a new one generally, it is a case of first impression in the Maryland Court of Appeals. It must be
conceded that the holding of the Court is in accord with the
weight of authority elsewhere, but it is to be regretted that
the decision was upon the basis of judicial precedent rather
than upon a consideration of the policy underlying the precedents.
The question of food adulteration had been presented
to the Court in two previous cases. The first of these, the,
Flaccomio case, 2 was an action in tort, based upon an offpremises sale of adulterated whiskey. The Court expressly
stated that there was no allegation of warranty, and that
it was not therefore called upon to determine whether there
was any evidence to support such an averment. The second
case, the Sindell case, was an action in tort against the
manufacturer of the beverage there sold, and was not concerned with the doctrine of implied warranty.
One of the leading cases on the majority side of the
question is Nisky v. Child's Co." There plaintiff was served
in defendant's restaurant, unwholesome food, which resulted in the more or less serious illness of the plaintiff.
She brought action against the defendant company for
breach of warranty generally, and for breach of warranty
under the Uniform Sales Act. The Court held that, at
common law, in the absence of express warranty or a representation from which a warranty could be inferred, the
mere sale of goods without more, did not warrant the quality of the article sold. While the Uniform Sales Act 5
changed this, that act only applied if the transaction could
be regarded as a sale. The service of food, however, was
never regarded as a sale at common law, and, this being so,
there is no obligation on the keeper of a public eating house
other than reasonable care. He is liable only for negligence, and cannot be held on an implied warranty that the
food served is free from deleterious matter.
2Flaccomlo v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 100 Atl. 510 (1916).
'Goldman & Freiman Bottling Co. v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488. 117 At. 866
(1922).
'103 N. J. L. 464, 135 At1. 805, 50 A. L. R. 227 (1927).
Uniform Sales Act, See. 15; Md. Code, Art. 83, Sec. 36.
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On the other side of the question the leading case is
Friend v. Child's Dining Hall." In that case plaintiff was
served, in defendant's restaurant, food contaiing deleterious matter which caused plaintiff to break a tooth. In
holding the defendant liable for a breach of implied warranty, the Court held that under the Uniform Sales Act the
transaction arising from a contract to serve a guest food to
be eaten upon the premises was a sale, and that, since it can
be inferred from the relation of the parties that the guest
makes known his particular purpose and relies on the
seller's skill and judgment in the selection and preparation
of the food, there is an implied warranty that it is reasonably fit for such purposes. Further the Court held that
there was also at common law an implied term of the contract that the guest should be furnished wholesome food by
the proprietor of a public eating house to which he resorted
for refreshment.'
The difference in point of view presented by these two
cases seemingly is whether the transaction is a sale, and,
incidentally, whether at common law there was an implied
warranty of wholesomeness. In point of actual fact the
basis of the difference comes (as can be seen by a comparison of the opinions in the principal case) in the protection
of the restaurant-keeper on the one hand, or the guest on
the other.8 The determination of whether the transaction
was a sale is merely a means to the end.
The decisions mainly relied upon to establish that service
of food in a restaurant was a sale were criminal cases,'
which in order to prevent evasion of criminal statutes had
held the service of liquors, or quail, or oleomargarine with
a meal to be a sale within the meaning of the statute pre:231 Mass. 65. 120 N. E. 407, 5 A. L. R. 1100 (1918).
Such a holding is open to question. See Williston, Sales, 2nd Ed., 478,
Sec. 241, where it is stated that the old authorities seem to have rested, in
part at least, upon the language of an old statute. And see particularly,
Ibid footnote 6. See also dissenting opinion of Crosby, T., in Friend V.
Child's Dining Hall, 120 N. E. 413 ff., 5 A. L. R. 1111 ff. The matter need
not be here further considered because it has only been incidentally relied
on to uphold the result reached.
I See Vold, Sales, 478, Sec. 153: "While at present time the authorities
are sharply divided, and in many jurisdictions the exact question has not
yet been passed upon, the more candid opinions among the cases which
have recognized this expansion of the warranty obligation now place it,
not on the fiction of calling the service of food a sale, but on the reality that
the need and occasion for extending this protection to the customer is
equally persuasive in both types of situations."
I See cases set out in Friend v. Child's Dining Hall, 120 N. E. 407 if., 5
A. L. R. 1103 ff., particularly Commonwealth v. Worcester, 126 Mass. 256
(1879), People v. Clair, 221 N. Y. 108, 116 N. E. 868! L. R. A. 1917 F, 766
(1917), Commonwealth v. Miller, 131 Pa. 118, 18 At. 938, 6 L. R. A. 613

(1890).
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venting sale of such articles. To this extent these cases are
distinguishable from the principal case, but it cannot be
logically said that a sale is any less a sale because in the
one case the result of so holding will be to prevent crime,
while in the other the result will be to open the way to obtention of damages. If the transaction be a sale in the one
case, it must be also in the other.
Irrespective of the reason for so holding, can the transaction which takes place when food is ordered and served
in a restaurant logically be said to be a sale? It has been
said' ° that where food is served by an innkeeper title does
not pass. So it was said that one who was served in an inn
could not, not having consumed all the food served, take the
rest of it off with him. Whether or not this be true in the case
of the innkeeper, can the same analogy be drawn today? The
ordinary transaction in a restaurant in the present day is
the acquiring of a portion of food, the service and place
for consumption being incidentally rendered. Can it possibly be said that one who orders a portion of food in a
restaurant, and pays for it, could be held liable if instead
of consuming the food, he took it off the premises? The
absurdity of such a position was forcefully presented by
Rugg, J., in the Friend case. There he pointed out that
many restaurant keepers both supply food to guests and
put up lunches to be taken out, and that to hold that there
was a warranty of wholesomeness in one case but not in
the other would be "an incongruity in the law amounting
at least to an inconsistency.""
The result of holding the transaction to be a sale seems
to be supported by Professor Williston. 12 As has been
stated, predication of liability upon whether the transaction
is a "sale" or "service" is merely a means to an end, and
of itself is an unrealistic way of talking about the problem.
Assuming that there is a logical basis for reaching either
conclusion (though it is believed that the weight of logic is
on the side of holding the transaction to be a sale), was the
result reached in the principal case in accordance with publio policy? If any justification can be found for imposing
liability upon the seller of food in order to insure the buyer's
protection, it is equally (if not more so) present in the case
where the provider of food is a restaurant-keeper than in
Beale, innkeepers, 169 and cases cited.
1112D N. 10. 409.
SOp. cit. supra note 7, Sec. 242b: "Whether this analogy (that title to
food served by an innkeeper never passes) holds good in a restaurant
where a customer pays not for a meal, but for a definite portion of food,
may perhaps be questioned."
10
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the case of the retail food merchant. The question then
presented is a broader one than the immediate one in the
principal case, and goes to the very basis of the doctrine of
implied warranties.
The bases of the decisions holding the seller liable for
injuries caused by defective food, even where he has been
guilty of no fault, have been severally stated as (1) that the
seller is far better able to hold liable the manufacturer who
sold him the goods than is the ultimate buyer, (2) that the
seller has many more facilities for knowledge than the
buyer, (3) that the guest, in ordinary cases, is unable to
prove negligence on the part of the restaurant-keeper. On
the other side it has been said that to impose such liability
leaves the way open for nuisance suits, and imposes "an
unjust and unnecessary burden upon a large number of persons engaged in a useful and necessary business. ""
That the minority holding does open the way to the
bringing of nuisance suits is undoubtedly true, for the only
evidence necessary to be introduced in such a suit is of the
contract of sale, of the deleterious matter, and of the consequent injury. On the other hand, to allow recovery only
on the basis of negligence is severely to limit the possibilities of recovery, for in many cases proof of negligence is
extremely difficult. While in many cases the doctrine res
ipsa loquitur will be held applicable 8 a still the doctrine raises only a rebuttable presumption. Thus in the
principal case a showing that the foreign matter was so imbedded in the bread that it could not be found even upon
reasonable inspection would preclude recovery. The obvious answer to this is that such a showing precludes negligence, and therefore should preclude recovery. Such an
1

3 Crosby, J., dissenting in Friend v. Child's Dining Hall, 120 N. E. 415.
13a The minority opinion states that "the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur"
would seem to have no application to such a case as this, as it applies only
where "the particular abnormality or defect which caused the aberration is
unknown." Assuming this latter standard to be correct, it must relate
rather to the question of legal' causation than to the physical condition
which produced the injury; for as pointed out in Benedick v. Potts, 88 Md.
52, 56, 40 Atl. 1067, 41 L. R. A. 478 (1898), the doctrine cannot be applied
until "the physical act has been shown, or is apparent, and is not explained
by the defendant."

The opinion then continues:

" . . . it

may reason-

ably be inferred that had it (defendant) exercised reasonable care in
handling and inspecting it, that it would have discovered the tin ... so that
the cause of the harm and the reason for it are known; that is, it is known
how it occurred and why it occurred. Therefore there was evidence of
negligence.... " But the evidence of negligence (the "why it occurred")
is the result of an inference, drawn from the fact that If defendant, which
selected the bread, had used reasonable care, It would have discovered the
tin. Is not this evidence by inference a direct application of res ipso loquitur, before repudiated in the same opinion? See also Goldman & Freiman
Bottling Co. v. Sindell, aupra note 3, 140 Md. 488, 497, 500.
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answer would, however, be equally applicable to cases under Workmen's Compensation laws were it not that the
policy of such statutes is to impose the cost of injuries
to employees on the business. There is no statute covering the problem of the principal case, but the inquiry is
suggested whether it would be desirable to impose, in effect,
the duty of taking out insurance against liability (or of
being ready to respond in damages) through the device of
allowing recovery in warranty.
But is the policy of the minority any more affirmative?
The ultimate basis of the dissenting opinion in the principal
case is that the restaurant-keeper controls the purchase of
raw materials, the employing of servants who prepare it,
and the manner and means of preparation, while the customer can know nothing of these matters until the food is
placed before him, and in many cases not until he has eaten
it. But this also misses a fundamental fact, viz. that in the
principal case, while the sandwich itself was prepared by
the defendant, the bread was not, and that, therefore, to
hold the defendant liable in such a case may result in holding one who is guilty of no negligence at all (again assuming
that the deleterious matter here was latent, and not discoverable even by proper inspection). It is, of course, true
that the guest is equally innocent, but it is a supposed fundamental principle of justice that one be not held liable
without fault. To this latter generalization it may be answered that the books are replete with examples of liability without fault, as in Workmen's Compensation and under the statutes of other states which hold the owner of
an automobile liable for damage caused by another who
is using the car with his consent. The question is whether
the restaurant situation may be analogized to these to the
end that the restaurant-keeper should be held liable without his fault.
Are the other policy arguments of the minority decisions sound? It is said that the remedy of the restaurateur against the manufacturer is easier of attainment than
that of the guest. Some doubt is cast upon this proposition by the holding in the Maryland case of Goldman &
Freiman Bottling Co. v. Sindell," (though that case dealt
with package goods) and by those cases which go so far as
to allow a remedy against the manufacturer for
breach of
15
warranty, though there is no privity of contract.
Supra note 3.
Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 796, 176 N. W. 382
(192D).
U
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Further it is said that the seller has more facility for
knowledge than the buyer. While this is true, it should not
be carried so far as to presume knowledge on the part of
the seller when he could have had none. Thus again in
the case of latent defects, the seller cannot be reasonably
said to have knowledge, and the fact that he has greater
facility for the obtention of knowledge should not be made
the ground of a liability which he could not reasonably
avoid. If the statement be taken to mpean that the seller has
greater facility for knowledge of the type and quality of
goods handled by the manufacturer from whom he buys it
has a more reasonable basis. Then the theory of holding
him liable is analogous to the theory which holds a principal
for the selection of his agents. But even this does not appear to be a sufficient basis for liability, for as a practical
matter deleterious matter finds its way into articles of food
despite caution. Therefore the logical result can only be to
hold the seller who purchases from a manufacturer whom
he knows or should know to be a dealer in defective goods,
but not to hold him merely because he happens to choose,
from among many competent, cautious manufacturers, one
whose goods in a particular instance turn out to be defective.
Even though the decision in the principal case may accord with the numerical weight of authority, there are several things about it to give one pause in considering it. The
assumption throughout that the denial of liability in warranty and the permitting of it only in tort does not actually
prevent the plaintiff from recovering is not entirely accurate. Actually, in many cases, if plaintiff can only recover
in tort he cannot recover at all. Then it seems medieval
and metaphysical to decide cases of this sort on the concepts of ''sale" or "service" in the furnishing of food in a
restaurant. The fine line between this case and the sale of
food in a grocery or to be consumed off the premises makes
it dubious that recovery in warranty should be denied in this
instance.
The concurring opinion poses the question of the extent
to which the principal question in issue in the whole problem is the danger of "nuisance" suits against restaurateurs if liability in warranty be imposed. If, as that opinion suggests, the ultimate solution must be a statutory one,
the legislature could well consider the desirability of compelling, in effect, insurance against liability by a rule (warranty) which would tend to assess the costs of such injuries
as part of normal business expenses.

